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THE NEW TEXTUALISTS' NEW TEXT
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most disputes over the meanings of statutes are about the fit
between events in the world and the words in the statute: The
defendant did x. The statute says it is a crime to do y. Should x be
considered a member of the category y for purposes of interpreting
the statute? Sometimes an event appears to fit within the language of
the statute, but it seems absurd to think that the legislature intended
to make the disputed activity a crime. At other times, the defendant
has done something similar to, and just as bad as, the activities
included in the statutory language, but it seems like a stretch to say
that the words include the event in question. Still, in other cases, it is
simply hard to know what to do. The debates are almost always over
what information a court should consider when making these
decisions, and what a court should do when there is inadequate
information on which to base a decision with any level of certainty
about either the language or the intention of the legislature.
These issues have generated a polarized debate in both the
courts and legal academic literature between those who regard
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themselves as textualists on the one hand, and those who advocate
for courts using a broader range of evidence on the other.' In
simplest terms, textualists claim that it is illegitimate for courts
engaged in statutory interpretation to rely upon the intent of the
legislature, and especially upon legislative history as evidence of
such intent. Their various opponents, in contrast, maintain both the
legitimacy and usefulness of these tools.3 At times, conflicts occur
between a statute's seemingly plain meaning, and evidence that
appears to suggest intent to the contrary. In these cases, advocates of
each position pose different arguments concerning how a dispute
should be decided.
Gone largely unnoticed in the battles between these camps
during the past quarter century is the fact that both sides in the debate
agree upon almost everything when it comes to statutory
interpretation. Most of whom textualists call "intentionalists" are
really not that at all. Rather, they take a pragmatic, eclectic approach
to the interpretation of statutes, seizing on whatever information may
appear to provide an interpretation that is loyal to the language of the
statute, the intent of its drafters, and coherent with the code in
general. Chief Justice Marshall's statement, "[w]here the mind
1. For a useful summary of some of this literature, see Michael Koby, The
Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of
Justice Scalia 's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369 (1999).
2. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997); John F.
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003)
[hereinafter, Manning, Absurdity]; John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity
of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001) [hereinafter, Manning,
Textualism]; William T. Mayton, Law Among the Pleonasms: The Futility and
Aconstitutionality of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation, 41 EMORY
L. J. 113 (1992); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of
Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1833 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, The
Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the
1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277
(1990).
4. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
(1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI-KENT L.
REV. 365 (1990); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive
Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003); Jonathan R.
Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53
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labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing
from which aid can be derived" characterizes this approach.5
Sometimes, information that may seem helpful in isolation conflicts
with other such information, and courts must exercise discretion.
Ordinarily, however, they are not in conflict, and the language of the
statute is applied without controversy. Supreme Court justices of all
political stripes routinely begin statutory interpretation by analyzing
the language of the statute.
6
By the same token, textualists do not eschew all contexts in the
interpretation of statutes, as a cartoon-like description of the
approach may suggest. To the contrary, proponents of both ap-
proaches find no difficulty looking at the earlier interpretive
decisions of courts, background assumptions shared by the relevant
community, constitutional considerations, questions of coherence
with related statutes, and a host of other considerations. Only some
context disturbs textualists, i.e., legislative history adduced as
evidence of legislative intent, which they regard as illegitimate.' The
two camps, then, espouse similar but competing approaches to
statutory interpretation that differ largely in the willingness of one
but not the other to use a particular species of evidence.
Recent writings from textualists explain how textualism can lead
to results in disputed cases that are sensitive to a statute's purpose
without resorting to extratextual materials that create both evident-
iary and conceptual difficulties. By adopting an enriched approach
to language as an initial matter, a view that considers context an
VAND. L. REv. 1457 (2000); Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting
Errors Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 309,
347 (2001); Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in
the Supreme Court, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 205.
5. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) For recent
citations by the United States Supreme Court, see Koons Buick Pontiac GMC,
Inc. v. Nigh, 125 S. Ct. 460, 470 n.1 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring); Lamie v.
U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 543 n.1 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).
6. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 125 S. Ct. 377, 382 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.) ("Our
analysis begins with the language of the statute."); Intel Corp. v. Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 255 (2004) (Ginsburg, J.) ("As in 'all
statutory construction cases, we begin [our examination of § 1782] with the
language of the statute."') (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S.
438, 450 (2002)).
7. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy.");
SCALIA, supra note 2, at 31-32; Manning, Absurdity, supra note 2, at 2431.
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important element of how we speak and understand language
generally, textualist practice can internalize a great deal of contextual
information while at the same time maintaining procedures less
likely to lead courts into a decision-making process that conflicts
with basic values such as separation of powers. As Professor
Manning explains:
Even the strictest modern textualists properly emphasize
that language is a social construct. They ask how a
reasonable person, conversant with the relevant social and
linguistic conventions, would read the text in context. This
approach recognizes that the literal or dictionary definitions
of words will often fail to account for settled nuances or
background conventions that qualify the literal meaning of
language and, in particular, of legal language. Accepting
this more modern understanding of textual interpretation, I
believe, offers a firmer and more legitimate basis for cutting
off many problems of absurdity at the threshold.8
This approach to statutory interpretation, reflected in many
opinions by Justice Scalia,9 incorporates a context-sensitive
perspective on word meaning that helps blunt the bite of reducing the
universe of evidence permitted in the interpretive process, thereby
increasing the power of the methodology. The key intellectual de-
cision is to focus on the ordinary meaning of statutory words, rather
than on their plain meaning, as found in dictionary definitions. What
makes ordinary meaning ordinary? It can only be that in the context
in which a word is used that meaning stands out as the one that was
likely intended, since that is what people generally intend when they
use that word. And if that is the case, then textualist judges (and
academics) who rely on ordinary meaning have built context into
their analysis without ever looking at anything outside the text.
The shift from focusing on dictionaries to ordinary usage should
be seen as an additional step toward reconciling textualist
8. Manning, Absurdity, supra note 2, at 2392-93; see also Manning,
Textualism, supra note 2, at 69 (discussing the constitutional danger in the
judiciary performing legislative functions).
9. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241-47 (1993), discussed
infra, in which Justice Scalia dissents from an opinion affirming the conviction
of the defendant for "using" a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, where
the defendant attempted to trade a weapon for illegal drugs.
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methodology with the goal of providing an interpretation that reflects
a statute's purpose. If so, it is worth asking how well it achieves this
goal. I argue here that in many circumstances it does so very well.
Nonetheless, there are several recurring situations in which the
textualist effort falls short, even on its own terms.
First, it is not a simple matter to reject the notion of plain, or
definitional meaning, in favor of ordinary meaning. In everyday life
we think both ways, and judges-even textualist judges-do so as
well. Thus, despite the intellectual attractiveness of focusing on
ordinary meaning, judges continue to rely upon the dictionary to a
great extent in their opinions. The ordinary meaning approach works
best when it is independently clear that the legislature really did have
the ordinary meaning in mind when it enacted the statute. But that,
of course, is exactly the inquiry that textualists argue courts should
not make.
Second, just as the use of legislative history is riddled with
evidentiary problems that result from the temptation to pick snippets
from a long record to support a particular position, corresponding
problems arise when attempting to find the ordinary meaning of a
statutory term. It is not always easy to decide what makes ordinary
meaning "ordinary." Thus, the linguistic orientation of the new
textualists is likely to provide results acceptable to a broad spectrum
of legal analysts in a broad range of circumstances. There will
remain, however, a residue of disagreement resulting from the
subordination of substantive analysis to methodological concerns in a
predictable range of cases. This Article explores some of the
advantages of the new textualists' approach to text and its underlying
psycholinguistic foundations, while examining some of the problems
it leaves behind.
II. Two APPROACHES TO THE MEANING OF STATUTORY WORDS
Let us begin with Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
the famous case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States
in 1892. A statute made it a crime "in any manner whatsoever, to
prepay the transportation... of [an] alien ... to perform labor or
service of any kind in the United States."' 0 A church was convicted
of violating this statute, having prepayed the transportation of its
10. Id. at 458.
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rector from England. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction." 1
The opinion expresses the conflict that courts experience when they
confront problems of statutory meaning.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Brewer first noted that
"the act of the [church] is within the letter of this section."'12 On the
next page, he continued: "It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because
not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."' 3 He
concluded: "No one reading such a title would suppose that Congress
had in its mind any purpose of staying the coming into this country
of ministers of the gospel, or, indeed, of any class whose toil is that
of the brain."'
14
Brewer understood at an intuitive level that while the minister's
activities were within the plain meaning of the statute (labor or
service of any kind), they were not within the ordinary meaning of
the words. Brewer chose the ordinary meaning approach over the
plain meaning approach when the two conflicted. What is so special
about Holy Trinity Church is that the same judge expressed
competing views of word meaning on adjacent pages of a single
opinion. How did Brewer know the ordinary meaning of "labor?"
He relied on his judgment as a native speaker of English, and
assumed others shared his view. Scholars often discuss this case for
the fact that the Court used legislative history to confirm that
Congress intended the word "labor" to be used in the narrower,
ordinary sense.' 5 It is also possible to understand this case, however,
as an example of a Court struggling between these two different
notions of word meaning, and choosing the ordinary meaning
approach over the plain meaning approach, much in the style of
contemporary textualists.
The tension between these two approaches to the meanings of
statutes-plain meaning versus ordinary meaning-appears fre-
quently in American legal decisions. 16  The most interesting
11. Seeid. at472.
12. Id. at 458.
13. Id. at 459.
14. Id. at 463.
15. See SCALIA, supra note 2, at 18-23; Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1835-
36.
16. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. V. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Comm. for
Handgun Control, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 388 F. Supp. 216
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examples are those where the members of the Court divide between
the two approaches. We see this in the 1993 Supreme Court case,
Smith v. United States.17  John Smith drove from Tennessee to
Florida, where he planned to buy cocaine from a contact he had
there. 8  To his dismay, his contact had become a government
informant, who arranged a meeting with undercover police officers.19
At the meeting, Smith offered to trade his unloaded machine gun,
which he had in a case, for the drugs.20  The undercover agents
pretended to agree, and said they would return soon with the
cocaine. 21  Smith, however, became uncomfortable with the
situation, and drove off in his van.22 The police caught him, and the
state prosecuted him for attempting to procure cocaine using a
firearm.23 A federal statute required an enhanced sentence for
anyone who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. ' 2  The court found that
Smith did just that.25 The statute imposed a minimum of five years
in prison for those using an ordinary firearm, 26 and a minimum of
thirty years for those using a machinegun.27 The court sentenced
Smith to the thirty-year statutory minimum.
28
The case made its way to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the
conviction by a vote of six to three.29 Writing for the majority,
Justice O'Connor first recited the rule of law that "[w]hen a word is
not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its
ordinary or natural meaning. ' 30 How does one find the ordinary
meaning? She looked up the word "use" in a number of dictionaries:
"Webster's defines 'to use' as '[t]o convert to one's service' or 'to
(1974); United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805);
17. 508 U.S. 223 (1993).






24. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000).
25. Smith, 508 U.S. at 241.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000).
27. Id. § 924(c)(1)(B).
28. Smith, 508 U.S. at 241.
29. Id. at 224.
30. Id. at 228.
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employ."' 31 Black's Law Dictionary contains a similar definition:
"[t]o make use of; to convert to one's service; to employ; to avail
oneself of; to utilize; to carry out a purpose or action by means of."
32
Earlier Supreme Court decisions employed similar definitions.
33
Justice Scalia dissented.34 Relying upon his judgments about
meanings that come from everyday use, Scalia echoed Justice
Brewer's perspective from Holy Trinity Church, decided 100 years
earlier.35 He wrote:
In the search for statutory meaning, we give nontechnical
words and phrases their ordinary meaning. To use an
instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended
purpose. When someone asks, "Do you use a cane?," he is
not inquiring whether you have your grandfather's silver-
handled walking stick on display in the hall; he wants to
know whether you walk with a cane. Similarly, to speak of
"using a firearm" is to speak of using it for its distinctive
purpose, i.e., as a weapon. To be sure, "one can use a
firearm in a number of ways," including as an article of
exchange, just as one can "use" a cane as a hall
decoration-but that is not the ordinary meaning of "using"
the one or the other. The Court does not appear to grasp the
distinction between how a word can be used and how it
ordinarily is used. It would, indeed, be "both reasonable
and normal to say that petitioner 'used' his MAC-10 in his
drug trafficking offense by trading it for cocaine." It would
also be reasonable and normal to say that he "used" it to
scratch his head. When one wishes to describe the action of
employing the instrument of a firearm for such unusual
purposes, "use" is assuredly a verb one could select. But
that says nothing about whether the ordinary meaning of
the phrase "uses a firearm" embraces such extraordinary
employments. It is unquestionably not reasonable and
normal, I think, to say simply "do not use firearms" when
31. Id. at 228-29 (alteration in original).
32. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990).
33. See Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 500 (1884); Astor v. Merritt, 111
U.S. 202, 213 (1884).
34. Smith, 508 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 242-43.
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one means to prohibit selling or scratching with them.
3 6
Scalia also referred to the dictionary, but did so only to point out how
many definitions of "use" it contains to further emphasize his point
that "use" gets most of its meaning from context.3 7  O'Connor
replied to Scalia's remarks and disrespectful tone:
There is a significant flaw to this argument. It is one thing
to say that the ordinary meaning of "uses a firearm"
includes using a firearm as a weapon, since that is the
intended purpose of a firearm and the example of "use" that
most immediately comes to mind. But it is quite another to
conclude that, as a result, the phrase also excludes any other
use. Certainly that conclusion does not follow from the
phrase "uses... a firearm" itself. As the dictionary
definitions and experience make clear, one can use a
firearm in a number of ways. That one example of "use" is
the first to come to mind when the phrase "uses... a
firearm" is uttered does not preclude us from recognizing
that there are other "uses" that qualify as well. In this case,
it is both reasonable and normal to say that petitioner
"used" his MAC-10 in his drug trafficking offense by
trading it for cocaine; the dissent does not contend
otherwise.38
The exchange contains important substantive issues, along with
some entertaining ironies. Foremost among the latter is the fact that
Scalia, in a 1997 book on legal interpretation, ridiculed Brewer's
opinion in Holy Trinity Church, especially its reference to the "spirit
of the law."39 At the same time, Scalia used his dissenting opinion in
Smith as an illustration of how statutory interpretation should be
conducted.4 ° Scalia never recognized how similar the approaches
really are.
Far more important are the substantive issues. Although
O'Connor cast her analysis as one of ordinary meaning, her opinion
is far more consistent with a formalistic approach to legal
interpretation as embodied in Brewer's "letter of the law" analysis.
36. Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
37. See id. at 241-42.
38. Id. at 230 (alterations in original).
39. See SCALIA, supra note 2, at 18-23.
40. Id. at 23-25.
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This approach to interpretation often manifests itself in the "plain
meaning rule." A typical statement appears in Caminetti v. United
States,4 a 1917 Supreme Court decision:
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the
first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is
framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the
constitutional authority of the law-making body which
passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.
42
Courts continue to reference this rule today, and they routinely refer
to the "plain language" of a statute or other document as an argument
supporting one interpretation over another.
43
The Court never discusses the tension between plain and
ordinary meaning as a phenomenon in its own right. Rather, the
tension lies embedded in a larger controversy over the extent to
which statutory language can be seen as self-contained, or
autonomous, as Professor Tiersma puts it.44 The more self-contained
it is, the less role for judges, who are sometimes seen as an
antidemocratic force bent on making their own policy
notwithstanding the will of the people reflected in the laws their
elected representatives enact. Justice Scalia's "new textualism
'A5
discourages judges from referring to most contextual information,
especially information about the statute's legislative history leading
up to its enactment. That is why he remains so bothered by Justice
Brewer's reference to "the spirit" of a law more than a century ago.
46
Of course, it is impossible to interpret laws out of context. As
Manning accurately notes, textualists have no quarrel with this fact,
and permit a limited range of tools to be used in statutory
41. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
42. Id. at 485.
43. See Laime v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); Hartford Underwriters
Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (2000); Abdul-Akbar v.
McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir. 2001) ("[W]e have adopted what is
called the American Plain Meaning Rule....").
44. Peter M. Tiersma, A Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy, and
Statutory Interpretation, 76 TuL. L. REv. 431 (2001).
45. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV.
621 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, New Textualism]; William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1509 (1998) [hereinafter
Eskridge, The Unknown Ideal].
46. SCALIA, supra note 2, at 18-23.
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interpretation. 47 Such tools include references to dictionaries, to the
use of the same words elsewhere in the statute, to the use of the same
words in other statutes, to court decisions, and to a set of canons of
construction such as the ordinary meaning rule, among others. 48 Yet
because ordinary meaning takes into account the ways in which
people are most likely to use a word, the concept of ordinary
meaning is probabilistic. By assuming that legislators most likely
intended to use words in their ordinary sense, textualists import
context into their analysis through the back door. For the only thing
that is ordinary about ordinary meaning is the increased likelihood of
the meaning the author intended to convey in the context in which
the word was used.
In fact, judges who employ the ordinary meaning approach
justify its use in just that way. Consider the following statement by
Justice Scalia: "The question, at bottom, is one of statutory intent,
and we accordingly 'begin with the language employed by Congress
and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language
accurately expresses the legislative purpose. ' 49 To Scalia, then, the
ordinary meaning of statutory language provides a method for
drawing an inference about the legislature's intent without engaging
in extratextual investigation. 50 He elaborates on the methodological
advantages of his approach in a dissent:
I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting
the meaning of language in a statute: first, find the ordinary
meaning of the language in its textual context; and second,
using established canons of construction, ask whether there
is any clear indication that some permissible meaning other
than the ordinary one applies. If not-and especially if a
good reason for the ordinary meaning appears plain-we
47. See Manning, Textualism, supra note 2, at 71-72.
48. See generally Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 45 (discussing
Scalia's new textualism approach).
49. Morales v. TWA, 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc.
v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1985)).
50. Statements of this sort are inconsistent with Scalia's stronger position
that legislative intent is in principle, irrelevant to the process of statutory
interpretation because legislatures can have no intent. For detailed discussion,
see Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of
Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427,433-36 (2005).
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apply that ordinary meaning. 51
The plain meaning approach, in contrast, asks only whether the
disputed events fit cleanly within the outer boundaries of the
disputed word's meaning. Context is not important as long as the
event fits within the language of the statute. If one relies upon plain
meaning alone, the approach will likely lead to absurd results when
the words incorporate a situation that the legislature clearly did not
intend to make illegal. A classic example is United States v. Kirby,
52
an 1868 case cited by the Supreme Court in Church of the Holy
Trinity.53  A statute made it illegal to "knowingly and willfully
obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, or of any driver or carrier,
or of any horse or carriage carrying the same."54 Kirby was a local
sheriff in Kentucky, chasing a man named Farris, who worked as a
letter carrier and was wanted for murder. Kirby arrested Farris, and
was later prosecuted for obstructing delivery of the mail. A un-
animous Court reversed his conviction because it made no sense to
think that Congress would have wanted it otherwise.
55
Thus, the consequences of choosing between the plain meaning
and ordinary meaning approaches to statutory interpretation depend
largely upon what other evidence a court is willing to consider. The
less extra textual material a court takes into account, the bigger the
danger of injustice posed by the plain meaning approach, and the
more the need for the ordinary meaning approach. Even the
staunchest textualists seem to recognize this.
Making things more difficult for the legal system, neither courts
nor legal scholars typically distinguish between these two concepts
analytically. Although some scholars recognize and rely upon the
distinction, 56 it is not unusual to read that the words of a statute
51. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868).
53. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892).
54. Kirby, 74 U.S. at 483.
55. See id. at 487.
56. See generally Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 199 (1999) (arguing for a "critical pragmatism" that candidly
acknowledges that the Court goes beyond the plain meaning of text during
statutory analysis); Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain
Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 715, 728
(1992) (arguing that courts "use various information-limiting decisional
devices of which plain meaning is a preeminent example to allocate scarce
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should be given their "plain and ordinary meaning," assuming that
these two terms mean the same thing. For example, the Supreme
Court has spoken of the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the word
"under" in the expression "an adjudication under section 
554.9957
Other courts use the expression routinely. 58 Often enough, the plain
and ordinary meaning will coincide, and contextual information will
serve to reinforce the interpretation. But at least in some instances,
as we have seen, the difference between the two interpretive
approaches matters. To see why this might happen, let us look at the
psychology underlying plain and ordinary meaning.
III. PLAIN AND ORDINARY MEANING:
A PSYCHOLINGUISTIC ACCOUNT
Traditionally, linguists and philosophers regarded the meaning
of a word as the set of conditions that must obtain for a statement
using that word to be true. To take a classic example, a bachelor is
an unmarried adult male. These conditions are each necessary and,
taken together, are sufficient to define bachelorhood. This approach
to meaning, sometimes called the classical approach because it is
based on Aristotelean logic, is consistent with both the plain meaning
approach to statutory interpretation and, more generally, with
everyday notions of a rule of law.59  A law consists of various
elements. Only if you disobey them all do you violate the law.
For the past quarter century, psychologists, linguists and
decisional resources and to achieve a degree of agreement... which might be
harder to achieve were decisions based on a wider set of decisionally relevant
information").
57. Ardestani v. I.N.S., 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991); see also PUD No. 1 v.
Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 725 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(discussing the "plain and ordinary meaning" of "discharge" in connection
with the applicability of an environmental statute).
58. See, e.g., Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 145 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[W]e
have noted that 'congressional intent is presumed to be expressed through the
ordinary meaning of the statute's plain language."'); United States v. Lachman,
387 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[I]f the language of a statute or regulation has
a plain and ordinary meaning, courts need look no further and should apply the
regulation as it is written.") (quoting Textron Inc. v. Comm'r, 336 F.3d 26, 31
(1st Cir. 2003)); Carter v. Tennant Co., 383 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2004)
(declaring the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the statutory language clear).
59. For further discussion of this point, see Lawrence M. Solan, Language
and Law: Definitions in Law, in ELSEvIER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LANGUAGE AND
LINGUISTICS (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript on file with author).
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philosophers have questioned the classical approach from a variety
of perspectives. First, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to define
words with conditions that are both necessary and sufficient.
Philosopher Jerry Fodor has been making this point for twenty
years. 60 To take a classic example from the legal literature, try to
define the word "vehicle" in the statute "no vehicles in the park," and
you will find it very difficult. 6 1 More basically try to define "book"
or "pen" or anything else in your immediate reach so that your
definition includes all instances of the concept and not much else and
you will find the task both daunting and time consuming. In short,
we are not good at defining things, which is one reason that judges
run to the dictionary so often.
The linguist Charles Fillmore showed how some problems with
definitions apply even to seemingly easy examples, like "bachelor."
62
All bachelors are unmarried adult males, but we are uncomfortable
calling some people bachelors, such as the Pope, Tarzan, and
homosexual men. 63  From this, one may conclude that even
"bachelor" is a category better described by prototypes and ordinary
usage than by definitions and plain meaning.
Second, in the 1970's, Berkeley psychologist Eleanor Rosch
began to question the psychological reality of the classical model.
64
She observed that classical definitions often understate our
understanding of concepts.65  Not only do we know whether a
concept obtains, but we know how well it obtains. Rosch conducted
experiments in which she asked subjects to rate how good an
60. See J.A. Fodor et al., Against Definitions, 8 COGNrrION 263 (1980).
61. This example has a long history in American legal literature. H. L.A.
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 607 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to
Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REV. 630, 663 (1958). For recent discussion, see
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 526 (1988); Pierre Schlag,
No Vehicles in the Park, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 381 (1999); Steven L. Winter,
An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV.
1881, 1885-1905 (1991).
62. Charles J. Fillmore, Towards a Descriptive Framework for Spatial
Deixis, in SPEECH, PLACE, AND ACTION 31-59 (Robert J. Jarvella & Wolfgang
Klein eds., 1982).
63. Id. at 34.
64. See Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories,
104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 192 (1975).
65. See id.
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exemplar a concept is of a category. 66 For instance, she found that
people generally agreed that chairs and tables were good examples of
furniture, but that lamps were questionable examples.67 Yet this
knowledge cannot be characterized by reference to defining
conditions, whether necessary or sufficient conditions.68  Rosch
argued that prototypes, rather than definitions, better capture what
people really know about categorization.
69
Third, concepts become fuzzy at the margins. We can elongate
a chair into a love seat and a love seat into a sofa. People might find
it hard to know what to call in-between sizes and are likely to
disagree with one another.
While examples like these may appear to threaten the use of
definitions as a psychologically-plausible theory of word meaning,
other research shows that it is too early for the funeral to begin.
Returning to the definition of "bachelor," the classic definition is not
all bad, even according to critics. No one thinks that anyone other
than an unmarried adult male can be called a "bachelor." So at
worst, the definition contains conditions that are necessary but not
sufficient. Other attacks on definitions, such as Fodor's, 70 recognize
this fact.
Anna Wierzbicka, a linguist and lexicographer, found a way to
bridge the gap between these two approaches to meaning. According
to Wierzbicka,7 1 the problem with definitions is not that they do not
work, but rather that they often refer only to external information to
the exclusion of internal psychological states.7z Wierzbicka adds to
the definition of "bachelor:" "a man... thought of as a man who can
marry if he wants to."73 Turning to a more legally relevant example,
the Clinton scandals provoked a societal debate over the nature of
truth and lying. Clinton's critics argued that a false statement
intentionally made is a lie, and that lying under oath is perjury. 74 His
66. See id.
67. Id. at 229.
68. Id. at 192.
69. Id.
70. See generally Fodor et al., supra note 60 (discussing alternatives to
definitional treatments of language and mind).
71. ANNA WIERZBICKA, SEMANTICS: PRIMES AND UNIVERSALS (1996).
72. See id. at 16-19.
73. Id. at 150.
74. For discussion of this dynamic, see Robert W. Gordon, Legalizing
2041
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:2027
supporters retorted that some lies are worse than others. 75  We
routinely tolerate white lies, exaggerations, and other untruths. In
fact, the perjury statute which refers to "material" false statements
recognized this fact.76 Using a standard definition that corresponds
to the substance of the perjury statutes, Wierzbicka defines lying as
knowingly saying something that is not true while wanting the hearer
to believe that it is true.7 7 But she adds to her definition that we
believe lying to be bad.78 Thus, we are uncomfortable calling some
false statements lies because we do not think it was wrong to have
made them.
79
What this move accomplishes, for the cases of both "bachelors"
and "liars," is to introduce context into the definitions themselves.
Part of what it means to be a bachelor rests on our everyday
experience concerning courtship and marriage, which might differ
significantly from one society to another, and at least at the margins
within a society. Similarly, we are most comfortable when we
reserve the word "liar" for a person who makes socially unacceptable
false statements. Once we incorporate this fact into the definition,
the distinction between plain and ordinary meaning shrinks. Thus,
Wierzbicka has embedded knowledge of the word's prototypical use
into the definition itself,80
Not only do definitional features seem to play at least some role
in how we conceptualize and categorize, the extent of the role of
prototypes in the psychology of word meaning has been the subject
of some debate. Rosch demonstrated that people are willing, when
Outrage, in AFTERMATH: THE CLINTON IMPEACHMENT AND THE PRESIDENCY
IN THE AGE OF POLITICAL SPECTACLE 97 (Leonard V. Kaplan & Beverly I.
Moran eds., 2001) [hereinafter AFTERMATH].
75. See id. For discussion of gradations of lying in the context of perjury
prosecutions, see RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE
INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 147-48
(1999).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1) (2000). For discussion, including the vocabulary
for true, but misleading statements, see STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN
THE FOREST (2001).
77. See WIERZBICKA, supra note 71, at 152-53.
78. Id.
79. For fuller discussion of this issue, see Lawrence M. Solan, Pejury and
Impeachment: Rule of Law or Rule of Lawyers?, in AFTERMATH, supra note
74. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN AND PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME:
THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2005)(chapter 11).
80. See WIERZBICKA, supra note 71, at 152-53.
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asked, to grade natural categories. For example, a robin is a good
example of a bird, an ostrich a poor one.82 Armstrong, Gleitman and
Gleitman demonstrated, however, that while prototype effects indeed
occur with categories such as "bird," when later asked, subjects do
not think that a prototypical bird is any more a bird than a non-
prototypical one, and disagree with the proposition that "bird" is a
graded category at all.83 Thus, while prototypes are part of our
psychology, they do not seem to provide a full explanation of how
we form concepts. Others agree. For example, while continuing to
eschew definitions, Fodor's recent work recognizes that prototypes
are part of our knowledge of meaning without constituting that
knowledge.
84
Most psychologists now believe that we think both ways. We
think in terms of prototypes in some circumstances, and in terms of
rules in others. Medin, Wattenmaker and Hampson found that
people prefer to rely on defining features when they do not have
much information about the surrounding circumstances.8 5  They
found, however, that when people have greater information about
context, they use family resemblance models based on prototypes.
86
Sloman suggests that people employ both rule based and associative
systems in reasoning and that conflicts between the two occur
frequently in everyday life.87 As an example, he suggests the
dilemma of deciding whether to wear a seatbelt for a car ride of a
very short distance, 88 say moving one's car from one parking space
to an adjacent one. An individual can rely upon experience-based
intuitions about danger and not don the seat belt, or can apply a rule:
81. Rosch, supra note 64.
82. Id. at 233.
83. Sharon Lee Armstrong et al., Wat Some Concepts Might Not Be, 13
COGNITION 263, 267 (1983).
84. See JERRY A. FODOR, CONCEPTS: WHERE COGNITIVE SCIENCE WENT
WRONG 88-108 (1998).
85. Douglas L. Medin et al., Family Resemblance, Conceptual Cohe-
siveness, & Category Construction, 19 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 242 (1987).
86. Id. For more detailed discussion of these issues, including suggestions
for how broader theories make their way into our concepts, see GREGORY L.
MURPHY, THE BIG BOOK OF CONCEPTS (2002).
87. See Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two Systems of
Reasoning, 119 PSYCHOL BULL. 3 (1996).
88. Id. at 19.
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always wear a seatbelt.8 9 Many other psychologists have reached
similar conclusions.
What all this means for legal interpretation, I believe, is that the
battle between plain and ordinary meaning is only natural. It appears
that people reason about concepts from both the top down, consistent
with the classical model, and from the bottom up, consistent with
prototype analysis. Even if the two approaches can be married, as
Wierzbicka's work suggests, 90 the two modes of reasoning continue
to exist side by side. The two rules of legal construction-plain
meaning and ordinary meaning-capture this fact.91 Judges rou-
tinely use both methods, although the plain meaning approach is the
more common. This is not a surprising observation given that it
appears, at least superficially, to be the more "law-like" of the two.
IV. CHALLENGES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETERS
In this section, I look at some of the problems that remain even
after courts adopt the ordinary meaning approach to statutory
language. While that approach does incorporate a great deal of
contextual information, difficulties recur. First, it is not always as
easy to abandon the dictionary approach as it may seem, and it is not
always clearly legitimate to do so if the goal is to establish a reliable
proxy for actual legislative intent. Second, once one chooses the
ordinary meaning approach, it is not always easy to determine what
the ordinary meaning is. This section will also look at some
promising approaches to interpreting legal texts that solve some, but
not all, of these problems.
A. Choosing Between Plain and Ordinary Meaning
Given the way our minds work, we should not expect it to be a
simple matter to eschew the plain meaning approach to word
meaning in favor of the ordinary meaning approach as a matter of
doctrinal imperative. They are both firmly embedded in the way we
think. This creates two problems. The first is that it may not always
be the case that the legislature has intentionally limited the scope of a
statute to the ordinary occurrences of the events that come within
89. See id.
90. WIERZBICKA, supra note 71, at 148.
91. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-37 (1993).
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statutory language. For example, Vermeule argues that the Supreme
Court, in deciding Holy Trinity Church, should have adopted a
broader interpretation of "service or labor of any kind," even if it
meant banning the transportation of preachers.
9 2
To take a more recent case that has been the source of
controversy, consider Chisom v. Roemer,93 a 1991 case interpreting
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Act prohibits states from
affording protected classes of people "less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of their choice." 94 In Chisom, the question
was whether the Act applies to judicial elections as well as to
legislative elections. 95 At issue, then, was the scope of the word
"representative" in the statute.
96
In a 6-3 decision holding that judicial elections are within the
bounds of the Voting Rights Act,97 the majority noted that the
statutory language came from an earlier Supreme Court opinion,
98
White v. Regester.99 That opinion, however, used the word "legis-
lators" where the statute in Chisom uses the word "repre-
sentatives."'100 The Court inferred that the change in language is best
explained by a desire to expand the scope of the statute to elections
other than legislative elections, 10 1 a goal consistent with the overall
purpose of the Voting Rights Act.
10 2
In his dissent, Justice Scalia scolded the Court for straying from
the ordinary meaning of "representative," which he determined from
looking at the dictionary.l°3 He noted that "[t]here is little doubt that
the ordinary meaning of 'representatives' does not include
92. See Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1850-57.
93. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000).
95. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 391.
96. Id. at 398-99.
97. Id. at 380-81.
98. Id. at 398.
99. 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973).
100. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 398.
101. Id. at 398-99.
102. Id. at 398-401.
103. For discussion of Scalia's selective use of dictionaries in this case, see
Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme
Court, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 275, 317 (1998).
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judges."'104 Without question, Scalia was right about that much.
When we think of elections of representatives, we ordinarily think of
legislators, not judges. He further stated:
The Court, petitioners, and petitioners' amici have labored
mightily to establish that there is a meaning of
"representatives" that would include judges ... and no
doubt there is. But our job is not to scavenge the world of
English usage to discover whether there is any possible
meaning of "representatives" which suits our preconception
that the statute includes judges; our job is to determine
whether the ordinary meaning includes them, and if it does
not, to ask whether there is any solid indication in the text
or structure of the statute that something other than ordinary
meaning was intended. '05
The issue then becomes whether courts must limit their
interpretation of statutory words to prototypical instances, even in the
face of evidence that the legislature had a more expansive meaning
in mind.
To the extent that Scalia justifies his position on the premise that
the ordinary meaning of a statute serves as an adequate proxy for the
intention of the legislature, however, the reasoning is questionable.
Legislators are not such consistent probabilistic reasoners that we
can always assume that any instance of a statutory word that strays
from the prototype is necessarily outside a statute's scope. They,
too, use words with both prototypical and defining features in mind.
While the ordinary meaning rule provides a useful rule of thumb as
to how a word was most likely used, it can do no more than that.
Moreover, as many commentators have noticed, legislators are
not the only ones who cannot help thinking in definitional terms.
Judges cannot help themselves either. Since Justice Scalia's appoint-
ment in 1986, references to dictionary definitions have not declined
in favor of ordinary meaning analysis. 10 6 To the contrary, they have
104. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As Professor Aprill
points out, the third edition of Webster's had come out prior to the opinion, but
appears to be less helpful to Scalia's argument than was the second, which he
cited in support of his analysis of word meaning. See Aprill, supra note 103, at
317.
105. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. See Aprill, supra note 103, at 277.
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increased, with Scalia himself being the largest contributor.
10 7
To illustrate, consider Justice Scalia's majority opinion in MCI
v. AT&T. °8  The case required the Court to construe the word
"modify" in the Federal Telecommunications Act, which authorizes
the Federal Communications Commission to "modify" the
requirement that carriers file schedules of charges. 10 9 If construed
broadly, it would permit the FCC to grant total exemptions to small
carriers from onerous tariff publication requirements.' If construed
narrowly, such exemptions would be beyond the authority vested in
the agency by the statute."' If ambiguous, the agency's interpre-
tation would prevail under familiar principles of administrative
law.'12
Various dictionaries provide definitions that support a broad
view, which might include the elimination of certain obligations
entirely, and other dictionaries define "modify" in terms of small
changes, which appears to be more in keeping with a narrower
interpretation. 113 The case became a battle over which dictionary
should be considered the most authoritative. 114 We will return to
such battles in the next section of this Article. 15 For now, though,
my point is that judges, including textualist judges, are perfectly
susceptible to construing words in terms of classical definitions:
conditions that must obtain for the word to be used appropriately. In
this case, Scalia held that, as a matter of law, modification requires
only "modest" change."16  The opinion does not consider that a
change may be modest in that it applies to only a small percentage of
107. See id. at 277 n.2; Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The
Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of
Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 227, 261 (1999) ("Justice Scalia has relied on
the dictionary more times than any other Justice in the history of the Court.");
Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARv. L.
REv. 1437, 1439 n.14 (1994).
108. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
109. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 203(b)(2) (2001).
110. SeeMCI, 512 U.S. at 228-29.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 226 (citing Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
113. See id. at 225-28.
114. See id.
115. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
116. MCI, 512 U.S. at 228.
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the overall tariffs.
Cases like these make it difficult to rely too heavily on
pronouncements that textualism's methodology uses an enlightened
vision of language. The best that can be said is that textualist judges
understand that the ordinary meaning canon is itself context sensitive
and that the methodology is willing to exploit that much context
without resource to legislative history. How this plays out in actual
practice, however, may be an entirely different matter.
B. Ordinary Meaning is Hard to Find
A second, evidentiary question arises when judges rely upon the
ordinary meaning of statutory terms. When a court decides to base
its decision on the ordinary meaning of a statutory term, how does it
decide what the ordinary meaning is? The answer, somewhat to the
embarrassment of the American legal system, is that courts find
ordinary meaning anywhere they look and judges are not restrained
in deciding where they are willing to look.
To see this dynamic in play, let us return to the statute at issue in
Smith v. United States,117 which made it a crime to use or carry a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. 118 Smith
was actually the first of three cases in which the United States
Supreme Court construed the statute. The second, Bailey v. United
States,119 was decided in 1995, two years after Smith. Bailey also
involved a person convicted of using a firearm during a drug-
trafficking crime.120 In that case the gun was in the trunk of the car,
with Bailey and the drugs riding in the front of the car.12 1 The
government argued that this constituted using a gun because Bailey
was taking advantage of the weapon to permit him to be bolder
during any drug transaction.' 22 A similar case, heard with Bailey,
involved a drug dealer keeping a weapon in a trunk in her bedroom
while she engaged in drug transactions in the front of her
apartment. 
23
117. 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
118. See id.
119. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 139.
122. See id. at 145.
123. See id. at 140.
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The Supreme Court decided nine to zero that Bailey was not
"using" a firearm. 124 The Court first reaffirmed its earlier decision in
Smith,125 and made mention of the various dictionaries. 126 But most
of the opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, who also wrote the
majority opinion in Smith, concerned the need to interpret statutes in
context. 127 She explained that in the context of the statute, "use"
implies some kind of active use that goes beyond mere possession.
128
In fact, the Court attributed this sense to the dictionaries as well.
129
Interestingly, the strongest argument was a linguistic one. The Court
gave the following example: "I use a gun to protect my house, but
I've never had to use it." 130 The Court surmised that in enacting the
statute, the legislature contemplated the second occurrence of "use"
in that sentence: active use of some kind.131
If the argument sounds more linguistically sophisticated than we
should expect from a judge not trained in linguistics-it is. As the
Court was deciding Bailey, Clark Cunningham, a law professor, and
Charles Fillmore, a linguist, published an article using the precise
example contained in the Court's opinion.132  They made the
linguistic argument that the court relied upon. 133 The opinion did not
mention the article, which clearly influenced the Court's thinking
regardless of attribution. So one answer to the question of where
courts find ordinary meaning is that they use their judgments as
native speakers, enhanced by serious linguistic analysis performed
by linguists when such analysis can be helpful. 1
34
Bailey's reliance on the analysis of linguists, however, is
124. Id. at 138.
125. Id. at 143.
126. Id. at 145.
127. See id. at 144-50.
128. Id. at 143.
129. Id. at 145.
130. Id. at 143.
131. See id. at 144.
132. Clark D. Cunningham & Charles J. Fillmore, Using Common Sense: A
Linguistic Perspective on Judicial Interpretation of 'Use a Firearm', 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 1159 (1995).
133. Id. at 1186.
134. For an analysis of situations in which phrasal analysis might lead to
more nuanced interpretation than reliance on the dictionary, see Craig
Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort to the
Dictionary when Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y
401 (2003).
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unusual. More typical (at least in this respect) is the third of the
Supreme Court's three "use or carry" cases, Muscarello v. United
States,13 5 decided in 1998. The facts are much like those in Bailey:
drugs in the front of the car, a weapon in the back. 136 But this time,
probably because of the Bailey decision some three years earlier, the
government charged Muscarello not with using a firearm, but with
carrying one, which the statute also covers. 13 7  In defense,
Muscarello argued that the ordinary meaning of the expression
"carry a firearm" is to carry the gun on one's person. 1 8 The
government argued that carrying a gun in a vehicle is the more
ordinary sense of the word. 13 9 The Court had to decide which sense
of "carry" should be considered the ordinary one for purposes of
interpreting the statute. 1
40
Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of the government by a five-
to-four vote. In the majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer, the
Court first established that the issue before it was the ordinary
meaning of the disputed expression:
We begin with the statute's language. The parties
vigorously contest the ordinary English meaning of the
phrase "carries a firearm." Because they essentially agree
that Congress intended the phrase to convey its ordinary,
and not some special legal, meaning, and because they
argue the linguistic point at length, we too have looked into
the matter in more than usual depth. Although the word
"carry" has many different meanings, only two are relevant
here. When one uses the word in the first, or primary,
meaning, one can, as a matter of ordinary English, "carry
firearms" in a wagon, car, truck, or other vehicle that one
accompanies. When one uses the word in a different, rather
special, way, to mean, for example, "bearing" or (in slang)
"packing" (as in "packing a gun"), the matter is less clear.
But, for reasons we shall set out below, we believe
Congress intended to use the word in its primary sense and
135. 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
136. Id. at 126.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2000).
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not in this latter, special way. 141
Note that the Court framed the issue by answering its own question
without the benefit of supporting evidence. What the Court called
"the first, or primary, meaning... as a matter of ordinary English"'
42
is precisely the meaning that the Court would have to find to be
ordinary in order to reach the result it did.
Next, the Court set out to answer its question more fully. Not
surprisingly, it first turned to the dictionary and quoted several
definitions that support its position. The Court acknowledged that
some dictionaries, including Black's Law Dictionary, appear to
support the defendant's position. 14 3 Black's defines "carry arms or
weapons" as follows: "[t]o wear, bear, or carry them upon the person
or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose of use, or for the
purpose of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action
in case of a conflict with another person."'" But the Court rejected
these as providing what it called "special definitions.'"'145 It opted
instead for the "primary definitions" contained in the dictionaries
cited by the majority.
46
To bolster its choice of dictionary, the Court turned to the
etymology of the word "carry" and found that it shares its Latin
origin with the word "car" 47 good news for the government,
assuming (without presenting a reason) that word origins should
make a legal difference. For anyone questioning the relevance of
this history, the Court brought out the Bible, with two quotes: "His
servants carried him in a chariot to Jerusalem"; 148 and "They will
carry their riches upon the shoulders of young asses."'149 Apparently,
we should infer that if this use of the word "carry" was good enough
for the Bible, it is good enough for the Supreme Court. It was
irrelevant that the Book of Kings was originally written in Hebrew,
and that the ordinary way of carrying a person is in a vehicle, while
the ordinary way of carrying a small object may be otherwise. Not to
141. Id.
142. Id. at 128.
143. See id. at 128-39.
144. Id. at 130 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990)).
145. See id. at 130.
146. See id. at 128.
147. Id. at 128.
148. Id. at 129 (quoting 2 Kings 9:28 (King James)).
149. Id. (quoting Isaiah 30:6 (King James)).
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offend the non religious among us, the Court also found some
examples from Daniel Defoe's novel, Robinson Crusoe, and from
Melville's Moby Dick. 
1 50
Perhaps somewhat more to the point, the Court observed that it
previously used the word "carry" in its opinions to refer to the
transportation of drugs in a vehicle.' 5 ' The Court also did its own
lexicography, using a computerized database of newspaper and
magazine articles that contained sentences using "carry," "vehicle,"
and "weapon."'' 5 2 The Court found "that many, perhaps more than
one-third, are sentences used to convey the meaning at issue here,
i.e., the carrying of guns in a car."' 5 3 In dissent, Justice Ginsburg,
writing for herself and three others, cited her own dictionaries, her
own passages from the Bible, and her own literary allusions. 5 4 Each
supported the defendant's position that the ordinary meaning of
"carry a firearm" means to carry the weapon on one's person.15 5 She
further pointed out that many English translations of the Bible do not
use the word "carry" in the passages quoted by the majority. 156 In
response to the majority's survey of newspaper and magazine
articles, she wrote: "The Court's computer search of newspapers is
revealing in this light. Carrying guns in a car showed up as the
meaning 'perhaps more than one-third' of the time. One is left to
wonder what meaning showed up some two-thirds of the time."
157
The dissent also considered the legislative history and the use of
"carry" in other portions of the statute.158 Ultimately, it concluded
that the language of the statute is hopelessly ambiguous, and neither
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 129-30.
153. Id. at 129.
154. Id. at 139-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
155. See id.
156. Id. at 143 n.4 (citing different translations to the Bible, other than King
James, including THE NEW ENGLISH BIBLE, THE NEW AMERICAN BIBLE, and
TANAKH: THE HOLY SCRIPTURES). In a conversation with Professor Aaron
Twerski, a biblical scholar and legal scholar, he stated that in the first example,
the original is translated literally as "cause to ride." Interview with Aaron
Twerski, Dean, Hofstra University School of Law, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (2001).
It refers to a dead body. In the second, the better translation is "lift." Id.
157. Muscarello, at 143 (citation omitted).
158. Id. at 140-41.
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meaning is clearly more obvious than the other.'5 9 When that
happens, courts sometimes apply the rule of lenity which resolves the
ambiguity in favor of the defendant.' 60  That was how the court
decided Bailey, 161 at least in part, and that is how the dissent believed
the Court should have decided Muscarello as well.
162
I dwell on this case at such length largely because it illustrates
how bankrupt courts are when they must actually decide just what
makes ordinary meaning ordinary. The argument more resembles a
food fight in a school for children with disciplinary problems than a
serious argument among distinguished jurists. One problem may be
that the majority is not entirely sincere when claiming that it actually
sought the ordinary meaning. In response to the dissent's marching
out dictionaries like Black's Law Dictionary, the majority said:
These special definitions, however, do not purport to limit
the "carrying of arms" to the circumstances they describe.
No one doubts that one who bears arms on his person
"carries a weapon." But to say that is not to deny that one
may also "carry a weapon" tied to the saddle of a horse or
placed in a bag in a car.
163
But this statement has nothing to do with discovering the ordinary
meaning. Rather, it says only that the majority's interpretation falls
within the range of the statute's possible meanings. The statement is
more consistent with the plain meaning approach, which leads to
broader, less nuanced interpretations. At least in part, the dispute
over ordinary meaning may be only an apparent battle. The real
fight is over the rule of law: is it acontextual and available from
reading the statute, or do we need to introduce context, whether from
the ordinary meaning rule or from information outside the language
itself?
C. Where Should Courts Look?
Where courts should look for word meaning depends upon what
they are looking for. If one really believes the best way to execute
the legislative will is by assuming that the legislature used statutory
159. See id. at 148.
160. See id.
161. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
162. See id. at 140.
163. Id. at 130.
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words in their most ordinary sense, simple introspection is a
generally adequate way to discover that sense. After all, linguists
rely heavily on their own knowledge of their native languages. They
have enjoyed great success exploring their own judgments about
grammaticalness, felicity, and preferences of one structure or
meaning over another. With the help of research assistants, I
examined cases in which the United States Supreme Court relied
upon the ordinary meaning rule in statutory interpretation through
the year 1999. Although our study no doubt missed some, the cases
we did study form a reasonable corpus for evaluation. We looked at
122 cases, the first one occurring in 1817.164 Forty-seven (39%)
were decided since 1980, demonstrating the important role that
textual analysis has played in recent times. During most of
American judicial history, the predominant methodology for
discovering ordinary meaning has been introspection. Without
fanfare, judges simply rely upon their own sense of how common
words are typically used. Although controversies sometimes emerge,
as in Muscarello, for the most part what judges say rings true
This did not change significantly until the 1980's, when Justice
Scalia was appointed to the Supreme Court. Although the 1890's,
the decade the Court decided Holy Trinity Church,165 was also a time
when the Court experimented with different methodologies, in the
past twenty years, dictionaries, precedent, and the use of similar
language in the same and other statutes have gained prominence,
with introspection declining in popularity. This suggests that
Scalia's textualism, so influential in American jurisprudence, is a
departure from the legal tradition, a point to which I return later.
First, let us look briefly at the various techniques that courts employ.
I will not say much about precedent as a method of finding
ordinary meaning. The notion is that if the courts have already
interpreted the word in the statute, or in other related statutes, then
the earlier decision is determinative of later cases. 166 And when the
legislature enacts a law adopting the language of a prior court
164. United States v. Sheldon, 15 U.S. 119, 121 (1817). The next instance
was Buel v. Van Ness, 21 U.S. 312, 323 (1823).
165. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
166. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998) (reviewing cases in
which the Court had construed "willfully" as part of effort to construe that
word in a statute requiring a license to sell certain firearms).
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decision, it is presumed that the legislature intended the words in the
statute to be understood as the court had earlier construed them.
167
Similarly, when the same word is used multiple times in a statute,
and the meaning is clear in some instances, then courts draw an
inference that the legislature intended the word to have that
interpretation in the other instances. This assumption may not
always be well founded, but it is sensible enough as a rule of thumb.
Moreover, legislators, knowing that a court will impose this
interpretation, are in a position to draft statutes that take these issues
into account.
Somewhat more problematic is the examination of how statutes
remote from the one in dispute use the same word. The Supreme
Court has done this occasionally throughout history, but it has only
become a popular method of interpretation in the past two decades.
A recent article by Professor Buzbee criticizes this method as
unconvincing. 168 If meaning depends in part on context, then why
would a mental health statute provide the appropriate context for
interpreting a word in, say, a statute dealing with the regulation of
the mining industry? 169  One function of the ordinary meaning
approach is to use prototypical experiences as a proxy for
contextualization. Searching for ordinary meaning in particular
contexts remote from the one in dispute seems doomed to cause
misinterpretations, as Buzbee convincingly demonstrates. 1
70
Without question, the biggest change in the search for word
meaning in the past twenty years is the almost obsessive attention
courts now pay to dictionaries, including using them as authority for
ordinary meaning. 171  Until the late twentieth century, Supreme
Court justices only infrequently used the dictionary as a source of
ordinary meaning. For example, they used legal dictionaries only
twice for this purpose before 1980, but fourteen times since (through
167. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 434 (2000) ("When the words of the
Court are used in a later statute governing the same subject matter, it is
respectful of Congress and of the Court's own processes to give the words the
same meaning in the absence of specific direction to the contrary.").
168. William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpre-
tation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 171 (2000).
169. See, e.g., id. at 181-82.
170. See id.
171. For references to works showing the overall increase in the Court's
reliance on dictionaries, see supra note 107.
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1999). They referred to standard dictionaries as a source of ordinary
meaning seventeen times before 1980, and seventeen times since.
They indeed referred to the dictionary for other purposes, but not as
authority for the ordinary meaning of a word. That, as discussed
earlier, came from the linguistic judgments of justices as native
speakers of English.
The problem with using dictionaries to determine the ordinary
meaning of a word, as we have seen, is that the purpose of a
dictionary is to determine the outer boundaries of appropriate usage
for each entry. Of course, many dictionaries present definitions in
the order of the frequency of their usage, so that information can be
helpful. But most of the time, the issue is not whether the statute
uses one distinct sense of a word over another (river bank versus
savings bank, for example). Rather, the question is whether, within a
particular definition, the situation before a court is so remote from
the circumstances in which a person would ordinarily use the word to
describe it, that it is only fair to conclude that the legislature most
likely did not have this sort of scenario in mind when it wrote the
statute. 172  Other than providing an articulate expression of the
general meaning to assist in that inquiry, dictionary definitions do
little to aid in that inquiry. And once judges begin to fight over
which dictionary to use,173 the use of dictionaries to determine
ordinary meaning is virtually futile.
Amidst all this squabbling, however, are some instances of
creative analysis. Among them is the use of linguistic analysis,
which the Court adopted in Bailey,174 and the use of large linguistic
corpora, which the Court used in Muscarello.175 While courts have
from time to time accepted advice from linguists concerning
statutory interpretation, a court's use of the LEXIS database to
engage in lexicographical analysis is most likely unique to
Muscarello.1
76
172. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 150 (1995) ("the word 'use' ...
cannot support the extended applications that prosecutors have sometimes
placed on it....").
173. E.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139-44 (1998)
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
174. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 141-50.
175. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128-31, 134-35.
176. Id. at 129.
2056
December 2005] NEW TEXTUALISTS' NEW TEXT
Let us return to the linguistic example in Bailey,177 which the
Court borrowed from Cunningham and Fillmore: "I use a gun to
protect my house, but I've never had to use it."17' As Cunningham
and Fillmore point out, it is no accident that the words "to protect my
house" appear with the nonprototypical occurrence of "use."'
179
Generally, unmodified forms reflect the prototypical, or unmarked
case in language. Compare their example to: "I use a gun, but I've
never had to use it to protect my house." This implies that the
speaker has experience shooting a gun, but has not done so to ward
off intruders.
Now let us turn to Muscarello,180 and the ordinary meaning of
"carry." The question is whether carrying a gun in a glove
compartment or trunk of a car comes within the "ordinary" meaning
of "carry.''8 The question answers itself. The very fact that one
needs to add "in a glove compartment" or "in a trunk" suggests that
these are not the prototypical uses of the word. To see why, let us
return to the Biblical examples that the majority opinion used to
support its position: 8 2 "His servants carried him in a chariot to
Jerusalem," and "They will carry their riches upon the shoulders of
young asses."'
' 83
Putting aside that both of these are poor translations of the
Hebrew version,184 in each example a prepositional phrase describing
how the carrying is to occur modifies the word "carry." In the first,
it is "in a chariot." In the second, it is "upon the shoulders of young
asses." Compare these to the following: "His servants carried him to
Jerusalem," 185 and "They carried their riches." The default
assumption is that they physically carried the corpse or the riches.
Further support of this analysis comes from sentences like the
following: "The chariot carried him to Jerusalem." Here, the verb is
177. 516 U.S. 137.
178. Id. at 143.
179. Cunningham & Fillmore, supra note 132, at 1186-87.
180. See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 125.
181. See id. at 127.
182. See id. at 129.
183. Id.
184. THE JEWISH PUBLICATION SOCIETY, TANAKH: THE HOLY SCRIPTURES:
THE NEW JPS TRANSLATION ACCORDING TO TRADITIONAL HEBREW TEXT
581, 678 (1998).
185. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 129.
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also unmodified and the carrying is direct, suggesting further that the
most ordinary use of "carry" implies direct carrying.
Recall that the statute speaks of "us[ing] or carr[ying] a firearm"
"during and in relation to ... [a] drug trafficking crime," but says
nothing about the manner of carrying the firearm. 186 The absence of
any mention of a means of transportation suggests one of two
possibilities: either Congress intended that the ordinary meaning
apply, in which case Muscarello should not have been convicted, or
Congress intended the statute to apply to more than ordinary
instances of carrying a firearm.
This method of analysis, which we might call linguistically
motivated introspection, is not new to judges. For example, the
dissent in Muscarello makes the following argument: the word
"transport" better conveys what the majority says is the ordinary
meaning of "carry."' 87 In fact, Congress used the word "transport"
in other sections of the same statute.188 Therefore, in order to give
effect to the legislature's choice of words, "carry" should receive the
narrower interpretation.
The structure of the two arguments is similar: the fact that the
statute does not say certain things-how the carrying is to occur in
my example, and the use of the word "transport" in the dissent's
argument 89 -provides evidence of legislative intent, or at least
evidence of how a legislature concerned about coherent interpre-
tation of its statutes might want a court to proceed. The problem is
that judges and lawyers, who have not learned about linguistic
markedness, are not likely to come up with such examples. Once
they are presented, however, the examples and arguments are
perfectly accessible.
In the adversarial system, it is basically up to the lawyers to
learn how to make these arguments. Whether they do so by reading
language-oriented legal literature, or by consulting with language
experts when a difficult linguistic issue arises in a case, they clearly
bear the burden. While judges, especially at the appellate level,
conduct their own research beyond that presented to them by
186. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2000).
187. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 146-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 924(b) ("Whoever, with intent to commit... an offense...
ships, transports, or receives a firearm .... ).
189. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 146-47(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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attorneys for the parties, it is expecting a lot of a judge with a heavy
caseload to search for exotic linguistic arguments.
D. Interpretive Communities: Technical vs. Ordinary Language
Finally, let us return to Justice Breyer's use of computerized
databases to discover the ordinary meaning of "carry."' 90 While the
dissent rightly criticizes the conclusion that ordinary meaning can be
inferred from approximately one-third of examples,191 the use of this
method is both creative and promising. Over the past decade, a great
deal of work has been published in the growing field of corpus
linguistics, both for basic research,1
92 and in legal settings. 193
This is not the place to explore the use of corpus linguistics
thoroughly. Yet even brief consideration raises questions that remain
hidden in current statutory analysis. For example, there are now
extensive linguistic corpora of English in both the United Kingdom
and the United States that include both written and spoken language.
These corpora can be further sorted by the source of the language,
whether literary texts, spoken language from law enforcement
officers, newspaper and magazine articles, and so on. When the
legal system decides to rely on the ordinary meaning of a word, it
must also determine which interpretive community's understanding
it wishes to adopt. 194 This choice is made tacitly in legal analysis,
but becomes overt when the analysis involves linguistic corpora
because the software displays the issue on a screen in front of the
researcher.
To illustrate this point, in Nix v. Hedden,195 the Supreme Court
had to decide whether a tomato is a fruit or a vegetable.196
Lexicographers and botanists call it a fruit. 197  American people
generally call it a vegetable, even those who know that it is
190. Id. at 129.
191. See id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192. See, e.g., TONY MCENERY & ANDREW WILSON, CORPUS LINGUISTICS
(1996).
193. See, e.g., Malcolm Coulthard, On the Use of Corpora in the Study of
Forensic Tests, 1 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 27 (1994).
194. See, William S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element
in Statutory Interpretation, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 629 (2001).
195. 149 U.S. 304 (1893).
196. Id. at 306.
197. Id. at 307.
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botanically a fruit. At the time, higher tariffs were imposed on
imports of vegetables than on imports of fruit. 198 The government
maintained that imported tomatoes were subject to the higher duty. 199
The importer said otherwise; that they should be considered fruit.
200
The Court chose the ordinary meaning above the technical
meaning.201 Somewhat ironically, this means that the ordinary
people lost. Tomatoes would cost more. Commenting on another
case in which the dispute was whether beans should count as seeds or
vegetables, the Court observed: "Both are seeds in the language of
botany or natural history, but not in commerce nor in common
parlance."' 20 2 This suggests that the distinction between ordinary
meaning and technical meaning is one of audience.
Access to computers now makes it relatively simple to see how
words are used in commerce and in common parlance. This allows
judges to easily become their own lexicographers. If they perform
that task seriously, they stand to learn more about how words are
ordinarily used, than by today's method of fighting over which
dictionary is the most authoritative. But if they do their own
research, they still must decide whether to apply the plain or ordinary
meaning, and if the ordinary meaning, whose ordinary meaning.
V. CONCLUSION
The new textualist methodology relies heavily on a vision of
language that itself contains an enriched vision of context. In
particular, it has replaced the plain meaning, dictionary approach to
word meaning, with the ordinary meaning, probabilistic approach.
The result is that it is possible to rely on language judgments alone
for a great deal of context-sensitive analysis of statutes.
I believe that this approach has a great deal to say for itself. For
one thing, the principles upon which it relies are both sophisticated
and traditional. Through most of American history, courts looked for
the ordinary meaning of the words in a statute to determine what the
legislature intended the scope of the statute to be.20 3 For another,
198. Id. at 305.
199. See id. at 306.
200. See id. at 305.
201. See id. at 306.
202. Id. at 307.
203. Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 46, 64 (1828) ("The
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most of textualist methodology, including the use of such evidence
as the statute taken as a whole, judicial precedent, and so on, are not
terribly controversial.
Yet matters are not so simple. For example, it is not entirely
clear that legislatures always have the prototypical meanings of
statutory language in mind. In some instances, they may be thinking
in terms of a broader interpretation. 20 4 The ordinary meaning rule
serves only as a proxy for the intent of those who wrote the statute.
There is no reason to overestimate the success of using this proxy,
especially when evidence to the contrary presents itself in particular
cases. 205 Next, judges, including textualist judges are unable to stick
with their program.206 Because we typically use both definitional
and prototypical information in understanding the meanings of
words, it is simply impossible to eschew a dictionary-like analysis,
even if one's politic vision says that one should do so.
Finally, it is not a simple matter to determine what constitutes
the ordinary meaning of a word in a close case.20 7  When such
debates occur, the courts are in complete disarray, with unbecoming
fights over the status of one dictionary over another, one literary
allusion over another or still worse, one biblical reference over
another.
20 8
Ultimately, the choice is between a more standard set of
methodologies, sensible enough most of the time but sure to result in
errors, even on its own terms, and a more relaxed set of evidentiary
standards, less able to constrain judicial discretion, but better able to
head off results that are likely at odds with what an enacting
legislature intended its law to accomplish. How one weighs in on
this debate is largely a matter of political preference, but at least to
some extent, an empirical matter. For that reason, I agree strongly
with those scholars who have called for more empirical research into
the real likelihood of mischief when judges resort to legislative
history, or perhaps other species of evidence that textualists reject.
20 9
ordinary meaning of the language must be presumed to be intended, unless it
would manifestly defeat the object of the provisions.").
204. See discussion supra Part IV.
205. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
206. Id.
207. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
208. See discussion supra Part V.C.
209. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The
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However one decides such matters for oneself, it is a healthy start to
acknowledge that we will not develop methods or standards that will
permit us to dispense with judicial discretion and still have a system
that does justice. Language, whether ordinary or plain, works well-
but not that well.
Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1301, 1323 (1998); Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law
Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications
for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1998).
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